How Hamilton Group Uses a Zero-Admin Approach to Managed IT
Administrator rights are powerful.
They can install software, change security settings, modify system services, add users, install drivers and alter the way a computer behaves.
That makes them useful.
It also makes them dangerous when they are given permanently to every employee.
Hamilton Group’s approach to managed IT is therefore based on a simple principle:
Users should work as standard users by default. Administrative privileges should be used only when they are genuinely needed.
That does not mean a business has no administrator capability.
It means:
no unnecessary standing admin rights on everyday accounts.
When elevated access is required, it should be:
controlled
temporary where possible
attributable to a named person
logged
protected with strong authentication
removed again when the task is complete
That is a much safer model than giving every user permanent local administrator rights simply because it is convenient.
What Does “Zero Admin” Actually Mean?
For Hamilton Group, a zero-admin approach means ordinary employees do not normally sign into Windows with permanent local administrator privileges.
They can still:
use Microsoft 365
browse the web
work with business applications
attend Teams meetings
use approved cloud services
access files and shared resources
What they cannot normally do without additional elevation is make high-impact system changes such as:
install unapproved software
disable endpoint protection
install drivers
alter firewall settings
create administrator accounts
install system services
change protected Windows configuration
The objective is not to make employees ask permission every time they move a mouse.
It is to separate:
ordinary work
from:
privileged administration.
Why Permanent Local Admin Rights Are Risky
A user with local administrator privileges can make major changes to their device.
If that account is compromised, an attacker may gain the same privileges.
That can make it easier to:
disable security controls
install persistence
alter protected files
install malicious services
change firewall settings
interfere with endpoint protection
create additional accounts
Removing unnecessary administrator rights reduces the attack surface.
Microsoft’s current Intune guidance explicitly describes Endpoint Privilege Management as a way of reducing risk by keeping users as standard users while granting elevated access only to approved applications or tasks.
It does not make malware impossible.
It makes one common route to excessive privilege much harder.
Least Privilege Is the Real Principle
The underlying security model is least privilege.
Microsoft defines least privilege as giving users and groups only the minimum access necessary to perform their role.
That means:
Ordinary employee
Standard user rights.
Finance employee
Access to finance systems, but not necessarily device administration.
IT administrator
Administrative rights only for the systems they actually manage.
Temporary worker
Limited and time-bound access.
Service account
Only the permissions required for the service to function.
The key question should always be:
What access does this person or process actually need?
Not:
What is the easiest set of permissions to give them forever?
Standard Accounts for Everyday Work
Even IT administrators should normally use a standard account for routine activity.
That includes:
browsing
document editing
Teams
downloading files
A separate privileged identity should be used for administration.
This reduces the exposure of powerful credentials to everyday activities that are commonly targeted by phishing and malicious content.
A highly privileged administrator account should not be the same account someone uses to open attachments from strangers.
Separate Named Administrator Accounts
Shared administrator credentials make accountability difficult.
If five technicians all use:
Administrator
with one shared password, it becomes harder to establish who:
installed software
changed a policy
created an account
modified a service
altered a security setting
Hamilton Group favours individually attributable privileged access wherever practical.
That improves:
auditability
offboarding
incident investigation
accountability
When a technician leaves, their privileged access can be removed without changing one shared credential used by everybody else.
Temporary Elevation Instead of Permanent Admin
Some users occasionally need higher privilege.
That does not mean they need to stay administrators every day.
Modern privilege-management systems can allow:
standard user
↓
approved elevation request
↓
specific task runs elevated
↓
user returns to standard access
Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management is designed around exactly this model. It can allow users to remain standard users while certain approved executables, installers or diagnostics receive temporary elevation.
Depending on policy, elevation can be:
automatic for trusted software
user-confirmed
subject to authentication
approved by support
explicitly denied
That allows security and usability to coexist.
Microsoft Intune Endpoint Privilege Management
For suitable Microsoft-managed Windows environments, Endpoint Privilege Management can make the zero-admin model much easier to operate.
Microsoft says EPM can:
keep users as standard users
define application-specific elevation rules
validate apps by publisher, hash and other criteria
support support-approved elevation
record elevation activity
help organisations transition users away from permanent local admin rights.
This means an employee who needs an approved diagnostic or installer does not necessarily need to know or receive an administrator password.
The privileged action can be controlled instead.
One caveat: EPM is an advanced Intune capability and requires additional licensing beyond standard Intune.
Controlled Software Installation
Removing local administrator rights should not prevent employees getting legitimate software.
A managed process can instead:
deploy approved applications centrally
maintain an application catalogue
validate publishers
check licensing
test compatibility
elevate approved installers
remove unauthorised software
This also reduces the temptation for employees to download:
fake PDF tools
“driver updaters”
questionable browser extensions
unlicensed applications
bundled adware
The user asks for the tool they need.
IT handles the privileged installation safely.
Windows LAPS Provides a Recovery Path
A strong zero-admin design still needs a controlled local recovery option.
That is where Windows LAPS can be extremely useful.
Windows LAPS automatically manages and rotates the password of a local administrator account and can back that password up securely to Microsoft Entra ID or Active Directory.
This avoids one of the worst old IT practices:
the same local Administrator password on every PC.
With LAPS, each device can have its own managed password.
That significantly reduces lateral-movement risk if one password is exposed.
LAPS Does Not Mean Users Get the Password
The existence of a LAPS-managed account does not mean the employee is handed its password.
Access to retrieve LAPS credentials should itself be restricted.
Microsoft’s LAPS architecture limits clear-text password retrieval to authorised privileged roles by default in Entra-backed scenarios.
That means the account exists as a recovery and administrative mechanism without becoming permanent everyday privilege for the user.
Windows LAPS Has Improved Further
On Windows 11 24H2 and later, Windows LAPS supports automatic account management.
Microsoft can manage characteristics of the local admin account itself, including whether the account is enabled or disabled and, depending on configuration, even randomising the account name.
For higher-security environments, keeping the managed administrator account disabled until needed can further reduce exposure.
This is a good example of why “zero admin” should not literally mean:
delete every administrative recovery mechanism.
It should mean:
remove unnecessary standing access and tightly control what remains.
Reduce Shared Passwords
A mature admin model should reduce dependency on shared credentials wherever possible.
Shared credentials create problems with:
accountability
rotation
leaver management
auditing
incident response
Where shared local recovery credentials remain necessary, tools such as Windows LAPS should manage them rather than relying on a spreadsheet containing:
PC-01 Admin Password: Summer2026!
That is not a privilege-management strategy.
Microsoft 365 Needs the Same Philosophy
Zero-admin principles should extend beyond Windows PCs.
In Microsoft 365 and Entra, not every IT employee needs:
Global Administrator
Microsoft recommends assigning the least privileged role needed for the task and using Privileged Identity Management for just-in-time access where appropriate.
Examples of narrower roles include:
Exchange Administrator
SharePoint Administrator
Intune Administrator
User Administrator
Security Reader
The right role depends on the task.
The goal is to avoid turning every administrator into a permanent “keys to the kingdom” account.
Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management
For organisations with appropriate licensing, Microsoft Entra PIM can further reduce standing cloud privilege.
Instead of being permanently active as:
Global Administrator
a technician can be:
eligible
and activate the required role when needed.
Microsoft PIM supports controlling, monitoring and reviewing privileged role access and enables just-in-time activation.
A stronger cloud admin process might therefore be:
standard identity
↓
separate admin identity
↓
eligible privileged role
↓
MFA / approval / justification
↓
temporary activation
↓
automatic expiry
That is much safer than permanent Global Administrator access for every technician.
MFA for Every Privileged Identity
Administrator accounts are extremely valuable to attackers.
They should therefore have stronger protection than an ordinary password.
Microsoft’s current privileged-role guidance explicitly recommends MFA for administrator accounts and just-in-time access through PIM.
Depending on the environment, stronger authentication may include:
Microsoft Authenticator
FIDO2 security keys
passkeys
Windows Hello for Business
A stolen password should not automatically equal administrative control.
The Emergency-Access Exception
There is one area where being too literal about “zero admin” can be dangerous.
Organisations still need a recovery path when:
Entra is unavailable
Conditional Access is misconfigured
normal admin accounts cannot authenticate
the endpoint has no network
cloud management is unavailable
That may involve:
LAPS-managed local administrator
protected emergency cloud accounts
out-of-band access
These accounts should be:
tightly protected
monitored
documented
tested
used only when necessary
A recovery account that nobody has ever tested is not much of a recovery plan.
Zero Admin Also Reduces Accidental Damage
Not every serious configuration problem comes from an attacker.
Users with administrator rights can accidentally:
remove security tools
disable encryption
change networking
install unstable drivers
uninstall business software
alter system permissions
Standard-user operation reduces the chance that an innocent mistake becomes a system-wide problem.
That improves both:
security
and:
supportability.
Better Device Standardisation
Zero-admin works particularly well when devices are centrally managed.
Hamilton Group can use management platforms such as Microsoft Intune to control areas such as:
applications
Windows configuration
encryption
endpoint security
updates
compliance
administrator group membership
That reduces the number of tasks employees need administrator rights for in the first place.
The more IT can deploy centrally, the less reason there is to hand out permanent local admin rights.
What About Developers and Power Users?
Some roles genuinely require more flexibility.
That does not automatically mean giving them unrestricted permanent administrator access.
A better approach is to identify:
which applications need elevation
which devices are involved
how frequently elevation is needed
whether EPM or another privilege-management solution can handle it
whether a separate development environment is more appropriate
Microsoft’s EPM deployment guidance specifically recommends starting with auditing, identifying user personas and common elevation needs, then creating rules before removing standing administrator rights.
That is a much better rollout method than:
Monday morning: everyone loses admin, good luck.
Audit Before Enforcement
This is one improvement I would definitely add to the existing article.
Before removing administrator privileges across a business, gather evidence.
Ask:
Who currently uses elevation?
Which programs require it?
How often?
Are those applications legitimate?
Can they be centrally deployed?
Can EPM rules handle them?
Microsoft explicitly recommends beginning an EPM transition with auditing, using the results to design elevation rules before users are moved from administrator to standard user.
That dramatically reduces disruption.
Exceptions Must Expire
Some employees may genuinely need temporary broader access.
That exception should include:
justification
owner
affected device
start date
review/expiry date
The worst model is:
“We made Bob an admin temporarily in 2022.”
and nobody ever removed it.
Privilege should be reviewed as part of normal joiner, mover and leaver processes.
Joiners, Movers and Leavers
A zero-admin approach improves access lifecycle management.
Joiner
Employee receives:
standard account
approved applications
permissions required for the job
Mover
Old access is reviewed and removed as responsibilities change.
Leaver
Accounts, sessions and privileged roles are revoked promptly.
This helps prevent privilege creep, where people accumulate access each time their role changes but rarely lose old permissions.
Zero Admin Is Not a Ransomware Cure
Removing admin rights can make some attacker actions more difficult.
It does not make ransomware impossible.
Security still needs layers such as:
endpoint detection and response
MFA
email security
vulnerability management
patching
secure backups
awareness training
network controls
Zero-admin is one control in a wider security model.
The current Hamilton Group article already makes this point well.
The Practical Hamilton Group Model
For many managed Windows environments, the model can look like this:
Everyday user account
Standard user.
Approved software
Deployed centrally through management tools.
Occasional privilege
Handled through controlled elevation.
Emergency local administration
Protected with Windows LAPS.
IT administration
Performed using separate named privileged identities.
Microsoft 365 administration
Least-privileged roles rather than default Global Administrator.
High-privilege cloud access
Just-in-time activation through PIM where appropriate.
Privileged actions
Logged and reviewed.
That is a much stronger interpretation of “zero admin” than merely removing users from the Local Administrators group.
What Zero Admin Should Never Mean
It should not mean:
nobody can fix the PC
every request takes days
users cannot install legitimate software
the business has no local recovery access
IT staff share one universal admin password
every technician gets permanent Global Administrator instead
Those would simply replace one security problem with another.
The aim is:
remove permanent privilege while preserving controlled administrative capability.
How Hamilton Group Can Help
Hamilton Group can help businesses reduce standing administrative privilege without making everyday IT difficult.
Our managed approach can include:
removal of unnecessary local administrator rights
Microsoft Intune
Endpoint Privilege Management
Windows LAPS
Microsoft Entra ID
Privileged Identity Management
MFA
application deployment
access reviews
joiner, mover and leaver processes
managed endpoint security
We also aim to make first contact on IT support requests within 15 minutes, so employees can get help quickly without needing permanent administrator rights simply as a workaround.
The objective is not to remove administrative capability.
It is to ensure powerful access is available only to the right person, for the right task, for the right amount of time.
Visit hgmssp.com or call 0330 043 0069 to discuss Managed IT and privileged-access security.