Admin Role Sprawl: Applying Least Privilege in Microsoft Entra ID

Administrative access in Microsoft 365 rarely becomes excessive overnight.

It grows gradually.

A colleague is made Global Administrator to complete a migration. A support technician receives User Administrator because a more suitable role was not considered. An external consultant keeps privileged access after a project ends. Several people accumulate permanent roles “just in case.”

Eventually, the organisation has more administrators than it can confidently explain.

This is admin role sprawl: the gradual accumulation of privileged access beyond what people currently need.

In Microsoft Entra ID, excessive roles increase the damage a compromised account, malicious insider or simple administrative mistake can cause. The solution is least privilege—giving each person only the permissions required for their job, only for as long as those permissions are needed. Microsoft recommends using task-specific roles, limiting Global Administrators and using Privileged Identity Management for time-limited access. 

What Is Least Privilege in Entra ID?

Least privilege means assigning the narrowest role capable of completing the required task.

For example, someone who resets employee passwords may need an appropriate password or help-desk role. They usually do not need Global Administrator.

Likewise:

• A person managing Teams does not automatically need tenant-wide control.
• A security analyst may need to review alerts without changing identity settings.
• A billing contact does not need access to user accounts.
• An application developer does not need permission to manage every enterprise application.

Microsoft publishes guidance showing the least-privileged Entra roles suitable for common administrative tasks. This helps organisations replace broad roles with purpose-built alternatives. 

Least privilege does not mean making every task painfully difficult. It means ensuring that access matches responsibility rather than convenience.

Why Admin Role Sprawl Happens

Role sprawl usually develops for predictable reasons.

Global Administrator Becomes the Default Choice

Global Administrator is familiar, powerful and likely to resolve permission errors immediately.

That makes it tempting during urgent work.

The problem is that the role can manage almost every aspect of Microsoft Entra ID and Microsoft 365. Assigning it to solve a narrow problem creates far more access than necessary.

Temporary Access Becomes Permanent

An employee receives a role for:

• A migration
• Holiday cover
• A security investigation
• A software deployment
• A one-off support case

Nobody records an end date, so the role remains for years.

People Change Jobs

An employee may move from IT support into project management while retaining their old administrative roles.

A manager may take over another department and accumulate additional access without surrendering previous privileges.

External Support Accounts Are Forgotten

Consultants and managed service providers may retain:

• Active admin roles
• Eligible Privileged Identity Management assignments
• Partner access
• Group-based role assignments
• Application-management privileges

Access that was appropriate during a project may become unnecessary after it ends.

Nobody Reviews Existing Assignments

When role assignments are never reviewed, administrators tend to accumulate rather than lose access.

Why Excessive Admin Roles Are Dangerous

A standard user account compromise can expose email, Teams messages and files.

A privileged account compromise can allow an attacker to:

• Create or modify users
• Reset passwords
• Add authentication methods
• Change Conditional Access policies
• Grant further roles
• Approve applications
• Access sensitive services
• Disable security controls
• Conceal persistence

Privileged access also increases the impact of honest mistakes.

An administrator working in the wrong tenant or selecting the wrong group can cause widespread disruption within seconds.

The objective is therefore to reduce both:

1. The number of privileged identities
2. The amount of time those privileges remain active

Start With a Complete Role Inventory

Before removing access, establish what currently exists.

In the Microsoft Entra admin centre, review:

Identity → Roles & admins → All roles

For each role, record:

• Active users
• Eligible users
• Groups assigned to the role
• Service principals or applications
• Assignment type
• Start and end dates
• Business purpose
• Role owner

Pay particular attention to highly privileged roles, including:

• Global Administrator
• Privileged Role Administrator
• Conditional Access Administrator
• Authentication Administrator
• Exchange Administrator
• SharePoint Administrator
• Intune Administrator
• Application Administrator
• Cloud Application Administrator
• Security Administrator

Also review Azure resource roles separately. A person may have limited Entra access but powerful permissions over Azure subscriptions, resource groups or services.

Ask One Question for Every Assignment

For every privileged role, ask:

What task requires this person or application to hold this role today?

Acceptable answers should be specific.

Good answer:

This employee manages Conditional Access policies and reviews changes through our formal change process.

Weak answer:

They work in IT.

Very weak answer:

They have always had it.

If nobody can explain the current business requirement, the role should be reviewed for removal or replacement.

Replace Global Administrator With Specific Roles

Global Administrator should be reserved for tasks that genuinely require tenant-wide authority and for carefully managed emergency access.

Microsoft’s guidance recommends minimising the number of Global Administrators and assigning specific roles for individual administrative functions. 

Possible replacements include:

The exact role should be selected using Microsoft’s current least-privileged role guidance and tested against the person’s actual duties.

Do not replace one broad role with five unnecessary roles. The goal is to match permissions to tasks, not reproduce Global Administrator through a collection of alternatives.

Separate Everyday and Administrative Accounts

Employees with privileged responsibilities should ideally use separate identities for:

• Email
• Web browsing
• Teams
• Routine office work
• Administrative activity

For example:

alex.smith@company.co.uk

adm-alex.smith@company.co.uk

The administrative identity should not be used for ordinary email or browsing.

This reduces exposure to phishing, malicious attachments and compromised websites.

Administrative accounts should also receive stronger controls, such as:

• Phishing-resistant MFA
• Restricted device access
• Dedicated Conditional Access policies
• Enhanced monitoring
• No ordinary mailbox where practical

Use Privileged Identity Management

Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management, or PIM, allows users to become eligible for administrative roles rather than holding them permanently.

When an administrator needs the role, they activate it for a limited period. The privilege expires automatically after the approved window ends. Microsoft describes PIM as providing time-based and approval-based activation to reduce excessive and unnecessary privileged access. 

A PIM activation can require:

• Multifactor authentication
• A reason for activation
• Approval
• A ticket or change reference
• A limited activation duration
• Notification to security personnel

For example, a support lead might be eligible for User Administrator but activate it only while handling an approved user-management task.

This changes the model from:

The person is always an administrator.

To:

The person can become an administrator when there is a documented need.

Eligible Does Not Mean Risk-Free

PIM reduces standing privilege, but eligible assignments still need governance.

An attacker who compromises an eligible administrator may attempt to activate the role.

Protect eligible accounts with:

• Strong authentication
• Conditional Access
• Managed devices
• Activation approval for critical roles
• Short activation periods
• Immediate notifications
• Regular access reviews

Highly privileged roles such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator may justify approval-based activation and especially short durations.

Use Approval Selectively

Requiring approval for every low-impact activation may slow support work without adding much security.

Apply stronger activation requirements to roles capable of major tenant changes.

For example:

Lower-risk operational role

• MFA required
• Business justification required
• One-hour activation
• No approval

Highly privileged role

• Phishing-resistant MFA
• Ticket reference
• Manager or security approval
• Thirty-minute activation
• Immediate alert

The activation process should reflect the risk of the role.

Review Active and Eligible Roles Regularly

Permanent and eligible assignments can both become stale.

Microsoft Entra PIM supports access reviews for Entra and Azure resource roles. Reviewers can approve or deny continuing access, and recurring reviews help identify assignments that no longer have a valid purpose. 

A practical schedule might be:

• Global Administrator: monthly
• Privileged Role Administrator: monthly
• Other highly privileged roles: quarterly
• Lower-risk administrative roles: every six months
• External or temporary administrators: at the end of each engagement

Review both:

• Active assignments
• Eligible assignments
• Group-based role assignments
• Application or service-principal assignments

A person who has never activated a role may no longer need to remain eligible for it.

Be Careful With Role-Assignable Groups

Microsoft Entra allows roles to be assigned through groups.

This can simplify administration, but it can also hide privilege inside group membership.

A user may appear to have no direct role while receiving powerful permissions through a group.

For every role-assignable group:

• Name it clearly.
• Assign a business owner.
• Restrict who can modify membership.
• Review active and eligible members.
• Monitor membership changes.
• Avoid nesting unclear groups.
• Use PIM for Groups where suitable.

Microsoft recommends approval processes for eligible membership in groups used to elevate users into Entra roles. 

A group that grants administrative access should be treated as a privileged security object, not an ordinary mailing list.

Review Applications With Administrative Roles

People are not the only identities capable of receiving privileged access.

Applications, automation accounts and service principals may hold Microsoft Entra or Azure roles.

Review:

• Application purpose
• Assigned role
• Owners
• Credentials and certificates
• Last activity
• Permission scope
• Whether managed identity can be used
• Whether the role can be narrowed

An abandoned application with a privileged role can be more difficult to notice than an overprivileged user.

Do not exclude non-human identities from your least-privilege programme.

Protect Emergency Access Accounts

Emergency access accounts are a deliberate exception.

They may hold Global Administrator because their purpose is to recover the tenant when ordinary controls fail.

However, they should:

• Be cloud-only
• Be used only for emergencies
• Have credentials stored securely
• Be excluded carefully from policies that could cause lockout
• Generate an immediate alert on sign-in
• Be tested periodically
• Never be used for routine administration

Microsoft’s current guidance emphasises restricting emergency accounts to genuine break-glass scenarios. 

Do not count emergency identities as ordinary working administrators when assessing everyday role sprawl.

Monitor Privileged Changes

Create alerts or review audit activity for:

• New role assignments
• Global Administrator assignments
• PIM activations
• Activation outside normal hours
• Changes to PIM settings
• Role-assignable group membership
• Applications receiving privileged roles
• Emergency account usage
• Privilege assigned without an expiry date

Microsoft Entra also provides recommendations that can identify opportunities to replace broad administrative roles with least-privileged alternatives. 

Monitoring turns least privilege from a one-time clean-up exercise into an ongoing control.

A Practical Role Clean-Up Plan

Phase 1: Discover

Export all direct, group-based, active and eligible role assignments.

Include users, guests, applications and service principals.

Phase 2: Validate

Ask role owners and managers to confirm:

• Current job responsibility
• Tasks requiring the role
• Frequency of use
• Whether a narrower role would work
• Whether access must be permanent

Phase 3: Reduce

• Remove obsolete assignments.
• Replace Global Administrator.
• Convert permanent roles to eligible PIM assignments.
• Shorten activation durations.
• Remove former employees and suppliers.
• Assign ownership to privileged applications.

Phase 4: Protect

• Require strong MFA.
• Use separate admin accounts.
• Restrict administrative access to managed devices.
• Configure activation approval for critical roles.
• Alert on privileged changes.

Phase 5: Review

Schedule recurring reviews and document all retained exceptions.

Common Least-Privilege Mistakes

Removing Access Without Testing

A critical business process may depend on a role that was poorly documented.

Test narrower access before removing the existing assignment where operational risk is significant.

Keeping Global Administrator “For Convenience”

Convenience is not a valid long-term justification for tenant-wide privilege.

Focusing Only on Permanent Roles

Eligible assignments, groups and service principals can also carry significant risk.

Making PIM Activations Too Long

An eight-hour activation for a ten-minute task recreates standing privilege for most of the working day.

Allowing Administrators to Approve Themselves

Critical role activation should have independent approval where practical.

Never Reviewing External Administrators

Consultants and service providers may retain access long after the original work ends.

Admin Role Sprawl Checklist

• Inventory all active and eligible Entra roles.
• Review Azure resource roles separately.
• Identify every Global Administrator.
• Replace broad roles with task-specific alternatives.
• Use separate administrative accounts.
• Introduce PIM for time-limited activation.
• Require stronger protection for privileged identities.
• Review role-assignable groups.
• Audit application and service-principal roles.
• Protect and monitor emergency accounts.
• Create recurring access reviews.
• Alert on privileged assignments and activations.
• Remove access promptly when responsibilities change.

Final Thoughts

Admin role sprawl is rarely caused by one reckless decision.

It develops through years of reasonable-looking exceptions, temporary projects and hurried support work.

The cure is not simply removing administrators. It is creating a repeatable system for assigning, activating, reviewing and withdrawing privilege.

Begin by identifying who and what holds administrative roles. Replace Global Administrator with focused alternatives. Convert permanent access into time-limited eligibility through Privileged Identity Management, and review both active and eligible assignments regularly.

Most importantly, require a clear answer to one question:

Why does this identity need this role today?

When that answer is missing, the access probably should be too.

Need Help Reducing Admin Role Sprawl?

Hamilton Group can help your business review and secure privileged access in Microsoft Entra ID.

Our experts can help you:

• Audit active and eligible administrator roles
• Reduce Global Administrator assignments
• Map tasks to least-privileged roles
• Configure Microsoft Entra PIM
• Introduce approval-based activation
• Secure administrator accounts
• Review privileged groups and applications
• Configure recurring access reviews
• Monitor role changes and emergency accounts
• Build a practical privileged-access policy

Visit hgmssp.com, call Hamilton Group on 0330 043 0069, or book a meeting with one of our experts to reduce unnecessary administrator access across Microsoft 365.